The death of a major cartel boss in Mexico has unleashed a violent backlash in which members of the criminal group have paralyzed some cities through blockades and attacks on property and security forces.
墨西哥一名主要贩毒集团头目之死引发了强烈反弹，犯罪集团成员通过封锁以及袭击财产和安全部队，使一些城市陷入瘫痪。
At least 73 people have died as a result of the operation to capture Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, or “El Mencho.” The head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel was seriously wounded during a firefight with authorities on Feb. 22, 2026. He later died in custody .
在抓捕内梅西奥·奥塞格拉·塞万提斯（又名“El Mencho”）的行动中，至少有 73 人死亡。 2026 年 2 月 22 日，哈利斯科新一代贩毒集团头目在与当局的交火中受重伤。 他后来在拘留期间死亡。
As an expert in criminal groups and drug trafficking in Latin America who has been studying Mexico’s cartels for two decades, I see the violent aftermath of the operation as part of a pattern in which Mexican governments have opted for high-profile hits that often lead only to more violence without addressing the broader security problems that plague huge swaths of the country.
作为拉丁美洲犯罪集团和贩毒领域的专家，二十年来一直在研究墨西哥的卡特尔，我认为这次行动的暴力后果是墨西哥政府选择高调打击的模式的一部分，这往往只会导致更多的暴力，而没有解决困扰该国大片地区的更广泛的安全问题。
Like many other figures involved in Mexico’s drug trafficking, Oseguera Cervantes started at the bottom and made his way up the ranks. He spent some time in prison in the U.S., where he may have forged alliances with criminal gangs before being deported back to Mexico in 1997 . There, he connected with the Milenio Cartel, an organization that first allied, and then fought with, the powerful Sinaloa Cartel.
与许多其他参与墨西哥贩毒活动的人物一样，奥塞格拉·塞万提斯从底层做起，一步步晋升。 他在美国监狱里待了一段时间，在 1997 年被驱逐回墨西哥之前，他可能与犯罪团伙结成了联盟。 在那里，他与千年卡特尔建立了联系，该组织首先与强大的锡那罗亚卡特尔结盟，然后与之战斗。
Most of the information available points to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel forming under El Mencho around 2010, following the killing of Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel Villarreal , a Sinaloa Cartel leader and main link with the Milenio Cartel.
大多数现有信息都表明，哈利斯科新一代卡特尔在 2010 年左右在 El Mencho 的领导下成立，此前伊格纳西奥·“纳乔”·比利亚雷亚尔上校（Ignacio“Nacho”Coronel Villarreal）被杀，他是锡那罗亚卡特尔的领导人，也是与千年卡特尔的主要联系。
Since 2015, Jalisco New Generation Cartel has been known for its blatant attacks against security forces in Mexico – such as gunning down a helicopter in that year. And it has expanded its presence both across Mexico and internationally.
自 2015 年以来，哈利斯科新一代贩毒集团因公然袭击墨西哥安全部队而闻名，例如当年枪杀了一架直升机。 它还扩大了在墨西哥和国际上的影响力。
In Mexico, it is said to have a presence in all states. In some, the cartel has a direct presence and very strong local networks. In others, it has cultivated alliances with other trafficking organizations.
在墨西哥，据说它在所有州都有业务。 在一些国家，卡特尔有直接存在和非常强大的本地网络。 在其他方面，它与其他贩运组织建立了联盟。
Besides drug trafficking, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel is also engaged in oil theft, people smuggling and extortion. As a result, it has become one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico.
除了贩毒外，哈利斯科新一代卡特尔还从事石油盗窃、人口走私和敲诈勒索等活动。 结果，它已成为墨西哥最强大的卡特尔之一。
There are a few potential scenarios, and a lot will depend on what succession plans Jalisco New Generation had in the event of Oseguera Cervantes’ capture or killing.
有一些潜在的情况，很大程度上取决于哈利斯科新一代在奥塞格拉·塞万提斯被捕或被杀的情况下制定的继任计划。
In general, these types of operations – in which security forces take out a cartel leader – lead to more violence, for a variety of reasons.
一般来说，由于各种原因，此类行动——安全部队除掉卡特尔头目——会导致更多暴力。
Mexicans have already experienced the immediate aftermath of Oseguera Cervantes’ death: retaliation attacks, blockades and official attempts to prevent civilians from going out. This is similar to what occurred after the capture of drug lord Ovidio Guzmán López in Sinaloa in 2019 and his second capture in 2023.
墨西哥人已经经历了奥塞格拉·塞万提斯之死的直接后果：报复性袭击、封锁和官方试图阻止平民外出。 这与 2019 年毒枭奥维迪奥·古兹曼·洛佩斯在锡那罗亚被捕以及 2023 年第二次被捕后发生的情况类似。
Violence flares in two ways following such high-profile captures and killings of cartel leaders.
在如此引人注目的抓捕和杀害卡特尔领导人之后，暴力事件以两种方式爆发。
In the short term, there is retaliation. At the moment, members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel are seeking revenge against Mexico’s security forces and are also trying to assert their regional authority despite El Mencho’s death.
短期来看，会有报复。 目前，哈利斯科新一代卡特尔的成员正在寻求对墨西哥安全部队的报复，并在埃尔门乔死后试图维护他们的地区权威。
These retaliatory campaigns tend to be violent and flashy. They include blockades as well as attacks against security forces and civilians.
这些报复行动往往是暴力和华而不实的。 其中包括封锁以及针对安全部队和平民的袭击。
Then there is the longer-term violence associated with any succession. This can take the form of those who are below Oseguera Cervantes in rank fighting for control. But it can also result from rival groups trying to take advantage of any leadership vacuum.
然后是与任何继承相关的长期暴力。 这可以表现为那些等级低于奥塞格拉·塞万提斯的人争夺控制权。 但这也可能是竞争对手试图利用领导层真空的结果。
The level and duration of violence depend on a few factors, such as whether there was a succession plan and what kind of alliances are in place with other cartels. But generally, operations in which a cartel boss is removed lead to more violence and fragmentation of criminal groups.
暴力的程度和持续时间取决于几个因素，例如是否有继任计划以及与其他卡特尔建立了什么样的联盟。 但一般来说，除掉卡特尔老大的行动会导致更多的暴力和犯罪集团的分裂。
Of course, people like Oseguera Cervantes who have violated laws and engaged in violence need to be captured. But in the long run, that doesn’t do anything to dismantle networks of criminality or reduce the size of their operations.
当然，像奥塞格拉·塞万提斯这样违法、从事暴力的人需要被抓获。 但从长远来看，这对于瓦解犯罪网络或减少其活动规模没有任何作用。
The upsurge in violence after Oseguera Cervantes’ killing occurs as some indicators in Mexico’s security situation seemed to be improving.
奥塞格拉·塞万提斯被杀后，暴力事件激增，原因是墨西哥安全局势的一些指标似乎正在改善。
For example, homicide rates declined in 2025 – which is an important indicator of security.
例如，2025 年凶杀率下降——这是安全的一个重要指标。
But other measures are appalling. Disappearances are still unsettlingly high . The reality that many Mexicans experience on the ground is one where criminal organizations remain powerful and embedded in the local ecosystems that connect state agents, politicians and criminals in complex networks.
但其他措施却令人震惊。 失踪人数仍然高得令人不安。 许多墨西哥人在当地经历的现实是，犯罪组织仍然强大，并嵌入当地生态系统，将国家特工、政客和犯罪分子连接在复杂的网络中。
Criminal organizations are engaged in what we academics call “ criminal governance .” They engage in a wide range of activities and regulate life in communities – sometimes coercively, but sometimes also with some degree of legitimacy from the population.
犯罪组织从事的是我们学术界所说的“犯罪治理”。他们从事广泛的活动并规范社区生活——有时是强制性的，但有时也具有一定程度的民众合法性。
In some states like Sinaloa, despite the operations to take out cartel’s leaders, the illicit economies are still extensive and profitable. But what’s more important is that levels of violence remain high and the population is still suffering deeply.
在锡那罗亚州等一些州，尽管开展了除掉卡特尔领导人的行动，但非法经济仍然广泛且有利可图。 但更重要的是，暴力程度仍然很高，民众仍然深受苦难。
The day-to-day reality for people in some of these regions is still one of fear.
对于其中一些地区的人们来说，日常生活的现实仍然是恐惧。
And in the greater scheme of things, criminal networks are still very powerful – they are embedded in the country’s economy and politics, and connect to communities in complex ways.
从更大的角度来看，犯罪网络仍然非常强大——它们嵌入到国家的经济和政治中，并以复杂的方式与社区联系起来。
The past two governments vowed to reduce the militarization of security forces. But the power of the military in Mexico has actually expanded .
过去两届政府都誓言要减少安全部队的军事化。 但墨西哥军队的力量实际上已经扩大了。
The government of President Claudia Sheinbaum wanted a big, visible hit at a time when the U.S. is pushing for more militarized policies to counter Mexico’s trafficking organizations.
在美国推动采取更加军事化的政策来打击墨西哥人口贩运组织之际，克劳迪娅·谢因鲍姆总统的政府希望给予一次重大、明显的打击。
But this dynamic is not new. Most U.S. and Mexican policy regarding drug trafficking organizations has historically emphasized these high-profile captures – even if it is just for short-term gains.
但这种动态并不新鲜。 大多数美国和墨西哥针对贩毒组织的政策历来都强调这些引人注目的抓捕行动——即使这只是为了短期利益。
It’s easier to say “we captured a drug lord” than address broader issues of corruption or impunity. Most of the time when these cartel leaders are captured or killed, there is generally no broader justice. It isn’t accompanied with authorities investigating disappearances, murders, corruption or even necessarily halting the flow of drugs.
说“我们抓到了一个毒枭”比解决更广泛的腐败或有罪不罚问题更容易。 大多数时候，当这些卡特尔头目被抓获或被杀时，通常不会有更广泛的正义。 当局并没有调查失踪、谋杀、腐败，甚至没有必要阻止毒品流通。
Captures and killings of cartel leaders serve a strategic purpose of showing that something is being done, but the effectiveness of such policies in the long run is very limited.
抓捕和杀害卡特尔领导人的战略目的是表明正在采取行动，但从长远来看，此类政策的有效性非常有限。
Of course, taking out a drug lord is not a bad thing. But if it does not come with a broader dismantling of criminal networks and an accompanying focus on justice, then the main crimes that these groups commit – homicides, disappearances and extortion – will continue to affect the daily life of people. And the effect on illicit flows is, at best, meager.
当然，除掉毒枭也不是什么坏事。 但如果不更广泛地瓦解犯罪网络并同时关注正义，那么这些团体犯下的主要罪行——杀人、失踪和勒索——将继续影响人们的日常生活。 而且对非法资金流动的影响充其量也微乎其微。